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Peter Klein: Four Considerations for the Delegation of Derived Judgment

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Key Takeaways And Actionable Insights

For entrepreneurs, the future is not risky, it’s uncertain.

Risk is a calculable mathematical probability, like the result of 1000 tosses of a (fair) coin, or the likelihood of you being involved in a car accident in 40 years of driving on US interstate highways.

The outcomes of entrepreneurial decision making are not calculable. They can’t be computed. Yet entrepreneurs need to make decisions, without having all the facts in hand today, and without knowing the odds of the future results. That’s uncertainty.

Therefore they exercise judgment. Judgment is action. It’s business practice.

Judgment is not guessing, or speculating, or hoping. Judgment is action. Specifically, judgment is taking ownership of property and resources, combining and recombining them in different ways, and using them to make a product or service to offer to the market.

Judgment also incorporates spirit: the imagination, energy, creativity and bravery that entrepreneurs apply when they act. Judgment is human action.

And judgment is continuous. Entrepreneurs are called upon every minute of every day to make decisions of judgment.

Judgment quickly becomes team action.

As firms grow, the founder can’t be the sole exerciser of judgment, or the only one making commitments or acting creatively and imaginatively. In larger, more complex, multi-divisional forms, there are many executives, managers and employees who will be called upon to make judgments. And they will be well-qualified to do so, since they have special skills and tacit knowledge that the rest of the firm, including the founder, do not have.

In fact the founders or owners (or Board Of Directors) actively seek the judgment of the whole firm, in order to achieve the highest level of business success. Often, they make sure that everyone in the firm has enough “skin in the game” (in the form of incentives, commissions and supplemental compensation) to motivate them to give their best judgment.

How does judgment apply in complex organizations?

The firm develops a mix of original judgment and derived judgment (see Mises.org/E4E_72_PDF).

Derived judgment is Peter Klein’s term for the delegating of decision-making power and its distribution throughout the firm. Original judgment — the ultimate decision-making power — rests with the entrepreneur-founder, or may reside with a Board Of Directors or an appointed CEO. Derived judgment is granted to others throughout the firm who have special knowledge and skills to act creatively and imaginatively on the specific uncertainty they face in their positions.

The skill of original judgment is selecting the right people to exercise derived judgment, and designing the right combination of motivating incentives and appropriate controls.

What’s the best combination of incentives and control?

Austrian subjectivism and individualism, along with opportunity cost analysis, can point the way to the best mix of incentives and control.

Subjectivism tells us that there is no objective right answer to questions about which decision rights the owner should delegate to which employees under specific circumstances. The answer to those questions depends on the particular circumstances of the venture, its technology, its market, its business environment, the characteristics of the employees and the characteristics of the owner.

Individualism tells us that there are no generalizations about people — each one has different knowledge and skills and characteristics like reliability or trustworthiness, as well as creativity and imagination. The entrepreneur must judge each one individually, and match them as well as possible to specific circumstances.

Opportunity cost analysis tells us to always weigh the potential upsides and potential downsides of each choice and each appointment of an individual to a position in which they can exercise derived judgment. Exercise judgment about judgment.

Consequently there are four considerations:

  • Be as sure as you can to choose the individual with the most (and most relevant) tacit knowledge for the area in which they are going to exercise derived judgment.
  • Choose the individual who adds the greatest amount of experience as possible to the relevant knowledge.
  • Make sure the derived judgment of managers and employees is guided by a well-articulated mission (why we do what we do) and business model (how we do what we do). Pay attention to how well these are understood and shared.
  • Balance knowledge and experience against the potential for abuse (misjudgment) and the potential cost of that abuse should it occur. Don’t risk “destructive entrepreneurship”.

There are no “bossless” organizations.

Peter Klein points out that even in the flattest of organizational designs (think Wikipedia, Zappos, Spotify, or W.L. Gore) there is always some kind of governance, either of rules or of hierarchical authority, to limit the risk from derived judgment gone awry.

Don’t design an organization with an excessive amount of derived judgment relative to the controls that are in place.

How good are you at original judgment and at delegating derived judgment?

Entrepreneurship in action is real people in real-life situations. It’s not theory. Some are going to be better than others, as indicated by results and outcomes.

It will be useful for you — although not definitive — to self-assess your entrepreneurial judgment and how you delegate it. Gallup’s Builder self-assessment promises to help you build a thriving company and a winning team. Personality assessments like the Big 5 are less specifically tailored to entrepreneurial judgment but can nonetheless shed some light on personality traits that are applicable in entrepreneurship, whether in a small business, a growth firm or a corporate structure.

Additional Resources

“Uncertainty and Entrepreneurship” (PDF): Mises.org/E4E_72_PDF

Read Peter Klein’s paper (with Kirsten Foss and Nicolai J. Foss), “Original and Derived Judgment: An Entrepreneurial Theory of Economic Organization” (PDF): Mises.org/E4E_72_Paper

Organizing Entrepreneurial Judgment: A New Approach to the Firm by Peter Klein and Nicolai Foss: Mises.org/E4E_72_Book



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Economy

Newsletter: Growth Hinges on Containing Covid-19

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This is the web version of the WSJ’s newsletter on the economy. You can sign up for daily delivery here.

Containment Policy

A strong economic recovery depends on effective and sustained containment of Covid-19, economists said in a new Wall Street Journal survey. More than 90% of business and academic economists agreed “somewhat” or “strongly” that economic recovery depends on containing the virus. “A virus resurgence will push consumer spending back into hibernation,” said Scott Anderson, chief economist at Bank of the West. Federal Reserve officials, including Chairman Jerome Powell, have voiced similar views in recent days, Harriet Torry and Anthony DeBarros report.

The U.S. entered a recession in February, the National Bureau of Economic Research determined last month. A recovery could already be under way. Economists in the survey estimated that gross domestic product contracted at a 31.9% annual rate in the second quarter. They expect the economy will expand at a 15.2% rate in the third quarter—though the obvious downside risk is from another big outbreak.

WSJ Video: Economists have long used letters of the alphabet like V and U to describe economic recoveries. But the coronavirus downturn is so different from past recessions that economists are coming up with new shapes to describe the potential return to growth. WSJ’s Jon Hilsenrath explains.

WHAT TO WATCH TODAY

The U.S. producer-price index for June is expected to increase 0.4% from a month earlier. (8:30 a.m. ET)

The Baker Hughes rig count is out at 1 p.m. ET.

TOP STORIES

Back to Work, Slowly

New applications for unemployment benefits edged down last week and the number receiving payments fell to the lowest level since mid-April. The fall in new claims extends a trend of gradual declines from a peak of 6.9 million in mid-March, when the coronavirus pandemic and mandated business closures shut down swaths of the U.S. economy. The modest easing of unemployment rolls, meanwhile, suggests new layoffs are being offset by hiring and recalling of workers, Eric Morath reports.

One other thing to watch in the weekly jobless claims report: The headline figures are for regular state programs. While those have been trending lower, the number of people receiving benefits through pandemic-response programs is going up. When you combine the array of long-established and brand new state and federal programs, total continuing claims hit a record high of 32.9 million during the week ending June 20, the latest data available.

Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said the Trump administration is working with the Senate to pass a new bill for coronavirus-related economic aid by the end of July. Mr. Mnuchin said the administration supports a second round of economic impact payments to households, an extension of enhanced unemployment benefits for furloughed workers and a “much, much more targeted” version of the Paycheck Protection Program of forgivable loans for small businesses, Paul Kiernan reports.

Harley-Davidson said it would cut about 700 jobs as part of a global overhaul, the latest company to reduce its workforce as the coronavirus pandemic depresses economic activity. The job cuts amount to about 13% of the company’s global workforce. Other companies have also said recently they would shed workers, including Walgreens Boots Alliance, United Airlines and Levi Strauss, Austen Hufford reports.

Meatpackers are trying to replace human meat cutters with robot butchers. Companies like Tyson and JBS have been slower to automate than other manufacturing sectors. The coronavirus pandemic has changed that, Jacob Bunge and Jesse Newman report.

U.S. cases hit another daily record. New cases in the U.S. rose by more than 63,000, as hospitals in Texas, California and other states struggle to accommodate a surge of new patients.

What’s behind new Covid-19 outbreaks? America’s patchwork of policies. Skyrocketing coronavirus cases in the South and West reveal missteps at all levels of government, Arian Campo-Flores, Rebecca Ballhaus and Valerie Bauerlein report.

Individual companies are often forced to step into the breach. Starbucks will require customers in the U.S. to wear masks at company-operated stores starting next week, as retailers look to keep employees and patrons safe, Heather Haddon reports.

Can We Build It? Yes We Can!

Gold is climbing toward a record high, oil futures went from minus $40 a barrel to $40 in a month and a half, but the hottest commodity in the U.S. these days is wood. Prices for forest products like lumber and plywood have soared because of booming demand from home builders making up for lost time, a DIY explosion sparked by stay-at-home orders and a race among restaurants and bars to install outdoor seating areas. Lumber futures are up more than 85% since April 1, Ryan Dezember reports.

WHAT ELSE WE’RE READING

Was shutting down the economy worth it? “Based on the best currently available evidence, we estimate that, by the end of 2020, Covid-19-mitigating public health measures will save between 500,000 and 2,700,000 lives in the U.S.; however, the economic downturn from shelter-in-place measures and other restrictions on economic activity could create a collateral loss of 50,400-323,000 lives. This manuscript concludes that Covid-19-mitigating public health measures are justified; however they can create potentially significant, albeit less overt, mortality,” Olga Yakusheva, Eline van den Broek-Altenburg, Gayle Brekke and Adam Atherly write in a new working paper.

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Economy

Reclaiming freedom

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We might be seeing a significant political change, with the left reclaiming freedom and anti-statism from the right.

I'm prompted to say this by the Black Lives Matter slogan, "defund the police" which invites us to see the state as an oppressor. As Grace Blakeley recently tweeted:

People know that the state is fucking them over just as much as their boss or landlord – in fact, it’s helping their boss and landlord fuck them over even more…Rather than saying ‘just give more state power to the goodies (us)’ we need to start saying ‘put power where it belongs – in the hands of working people’.

If we read this alongside the disappearance of right-libertarians (some of whom discovered that they like racism and inequality more than small government) and emergence of big government Toryism, we see a big change from a few years ago. Back then, it was the right who called for a smaller state and much of the left that wanted a bigger one. Now it is, if anything, the opposite*.

In one sense this is a return to normality. Historically, advocates of freedom were opponents of the existing order, such as Tom Paine, John Stuart Mill and – yes – Adam Smith**. And, of course, Marxists have long regarded the state as "a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" and looked forward to it withering away.

Which poses the question: why are things now changing (back)?

One reason is that the left has learned that states are indeed often repressive. I'm thinking here not just of police killings but of the social murder that is austerity and tough benefit sanctions, and the forced deportations of black Britons (something still going on).

Secondly, they've learned that, as Grace says, it is not good enough to "give more state power to the goodies". Yes, New Labour did make significant achievements in tax credits, Sure Start and better funding of schools and the NHS. But many of these have been reversed by the Tories in the subsequent decade. The left cannot pin its hopes merely on winning temporary (and partial) control of the state.

Thirdly, changes within capitalism have changed the state. Of course, capital (pdf) has always wielded power over governments. But there was a time when this was relatively benign. In the post-war war mass production Fordist capitalists needed a mass market and hence an affluent working class. Extractive finance capital, though, doesn't. It needs cheap and plentiful money which fiscal austerity helps provide. General Motors needed a large well-paid working class; Goldman Sachs, not so much. This means there is now more tension between the needs of working people and the function of the state than there used to be.

All of which poses the question. What would anti-statist leftism look like?

Many of you might think the slogan "defund the police" goes too far. No matter: we don't know what's right unless we know what's too much. And what is right – as Elinor Ostrom showed – is that the police should be small and locally accountable. Also, there's a strong case for decriminalizing drugs, in part because it removes a pretext for the police to harass black people.

A high universal basic income would also expand freedom, not just by removing the harsh conditionality of Universal Credit, but also by giving us the freedom to reject exploitative labour or to drop out of the labour market to care for others or to train for better work. As Guy Standing says (pdf), "basic Income’s emancipatory value exceeds its monetary value."

Also, left-libertarianism must empower local communities, and embrace the community wealth-building advocated by Martin O'Neil and Joe Guinan and pioneered by Preston council. In weakening the power of central government, localization mitigates the damage done by Tory austerity. And it also gives local people more republican freedom – the freedom to collectively control more of their own lives.

There's something else, which the Black Lives Matter movement is also highlighting. It's that slavery teaches us something about economics. As Peter Doyle shows in a brilliant paper (pdf), markets produce incentives to undermine others' agency. Although slavery is the most extreme example of this we also see it in everyday capitalist labour markets. As Marx said, when we they start work workers leave behind the realm of equality and freedom and become mere factors of production. Left-libertarianism would put in place institutions to resist this and expand the realm of genuine agency. This would comprise worker coops and more local say over public services.

I say all this not to offer detailed blueprints: Marx was right to be sceptical of these. Instead, the point is that the left can and should pick up the cause of freedom now that the right has abandoned it.

* We mustn't be misled by the right's loud assertion of a right to free speech. What they are really proclaiming is the "right" to spout rubbish without any comeback, which is an altogether different matter.

** If you think the Adam Smith Institute is a representative guide to Smith's thinking, the wallet inspectors would like to meet you.



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Economy

The Surplus Process

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How should we model surpluses and deficits? In finishing up a recent articleand chapter 5 and 6 of a Fiscal Theory of the Price Level update, a bunch of observations coalesced that are worth passing on in blog post form.

Background: The real value of nominal government debt equals the present value of real primary surpluses, [ frac{B_{t-1}}{P_{t}}=b_{t}=E_{t}sum_{j=0}^{infty}beta^{j}s_{t+j}. ] I ‘m going to use one-period nominal debt and a constant discount rate for simplicity. In the fiscal theory of the price level, the (B) and (s) decisions cause inflation (P). In other theories, the Fed is in charge of (P), and (s) adjusts passively. This distinction does not matter for this discussion. This equation and all the issues in this blog post hold in both fiscal and standard theories.

The question is, what is a reasonable time-series process for (left{s_{t}right} ) consistent with the debt valuation formula? Here are surpluses

The blue line is the NIPA surplus/GDP ratio. The red line is my preferred measure of primary surplus/GDP, and the green line is the NIPA primary surplus/GDP.

The surplus process is persistent and strongly procyclical, strongly correlated with the unemployment rate.  (The picture is debt to GDP and surplus to GDP ratios, but the same present value identity holds with small modifications so for a blog post I won’t add extra notation.)

Something like an AR(1) quickly springs to mind, [ s_{t+1}=rho_{s}s_{t}+varepsilon_{t+1}. ] The main point of this blog post is that this is a terrible, though common, specification.

Write a general MA process, [ s_{t}=a(L)varepsilon_{t}. ] The question is, what’s a reasonable (a(L)?) To that end, look at the innovation version of the present value equation, [ frac{B_{t-1}}{P_{t-1}}Delta E_{t}left( frac{P_{t-1}}{P_{t}}right) =Delta E_{t}sum_{j=0}^{infty}beta^{j}s_{t+j}=sum_{j=0}^{infty}beta ^{j}a_{j}varepsilon_{t}=a(beta)varepsilon_{t}% ] where [ Delta E_{t}=E_{t}-E_{t-1}. ] The weighted some of moving average coefficients (a(beta)) controls the relationship between unexpected inflation and surplus shocks. If (a(beta)) is large, then small surplus shocks correspond to a lot of inflation and vice versa. For the AR(1), (a(beta)=1/(1-rho_{s}beta)approx 2.) Unexpected inflation is twice as volatile as unexpected surplus/deficits.

(a(beta)) captures how much of a deficit is repaid. Consider (a(beta)=0). Since (a_{0}=1), this means that the moving average is s-shaped. For any (a(beta)lt 1), the moving average coefficients must eventually change sign. (a(beta)=0) is the case that all debts are repaid. If (varepsilon_{t}=-1), then eventually surpluses rise to pay off the initial debt, and there is no change to the discounted sum of surpluses. Your debt obeys (a(beta)=0) if you do not default. If you borrow money to buy a house, you have deficits today, but then a string of positive surpluses which pay off the debt with interest.

The MA(1) is a good simple example, [ s_{t}=varepsilon_{t}+thetavarepsilon_{t-1}% ] Here (a(beta)=1+thetabeta). For (a(beta)=0), you need (theta=-beta ^{-1}=-R). The debt -(varepsilon_{t}) is repaid with interest (R).

Let’s look at an estimate. I ran a VAR of surplus and value of debt (v), and I also ran an AR(1).

Here are the response functions to a deficit shock:

The blue solid line with (s=-0.31) comes from a larger VAR, not shown here. The dashed line comes from the two variable VAR, and the line with triangles comes from the AR(1).

The VAR (dashed line) shows a slight s shape. The moving average coefficients gently turn positive. But when you add it up, those overshootings bring us back to (a(beta)=0.26) despite 5 years of negative responses. (I use (beta=1)). The AR(1) version without debt has (a(beta)=2.21), a factor of 10 larger!

Clearly, whether you include debt in a VAR and find a slightly overshooting moving average, or leave debt out of the VAR and find something like an AR(1) makes a major difference. Which is right? Just as obviously, looking at (R^2)   and t-statistics of the one-step ahead regressions is not going to sort this out.

I now get to the point.

Here are 7 related observations that I think collectively push us to the view that (a(beta)) should be a quite small number. The observations use this very simple model with one period debt and a constant discount rate, but the size and magnitude of the puzzles are so strong that even I don’t think time-varying discount rates can overturn them. If so, well, all the more power to the time-varying discount rate! Again, these observations hold equally for active or passive fiscal policy. This is not about FTPL, at least directly.

1) The correlation of deficits and inflation. Reminder, [ frac{B_{t-1}}{P_{t-1}}Delta E_{t}left( frac{P_{t-1}}{P_{t}}right) =a(beta)varepsilon_{t}. ] If we have an AR(1), (a(beta)=1/(1-rho_{s}beta)approx2), and with (sigma(varepsilon)approx5%) in my little VAR, the AR(1) produces 10% inflation in response to a 1 standard deviation deficit shock. We should see 10% unanticipated inflation in recessions! We see if anything slightly less inflation in recessions, and little correlation of inflation with deficits overall. (a(beta)) near zero solves that puzzle.

2) Inflation volatility. The AR(1) likewise predicts that unexpected inflation has about 10% volatility. Unexpected inflation has about 1% volatility. This observation on its own suggests (a(beta)) no larger than 0.2.

3) Bond return volatility and cyclical correlation. The one-year treasury bill is (so far) completely safe in nominal terms. Thus the volatility and cyclical correlation of unexpected inflation is also the volatility and cyclical correlation of real treasury bill returns. The AR(1) predicts that one-year bonds have a standard deviation of returns around 10%, and they lose in recessions, when the AR(1) predicts a big inflation. In fact one-year treasury bills have no more than 1% standard deviation, and do better in recessions.

4) Mean bond returns. In the AR(1) model, bonds have a stock-like volatility and move procyclically. They should have a stock-like mean return and risk premium. In fact, bonds have low volatility and have if anything a negative cyclical beta so yield if anything less than the risk free rate. A small  (a(beta)) generates low bond mean returns as well.

Jiang, Lustig, Van Nieuwerburgh and Xiaolan recently raised this puzzle, using a VAR estimate of the surplus process that generates a high (a(beta)). Looking at the valuation formula [ frac{B_{t-1}}{P_{t}}=E_{t}sum_{j=0}^{infty}beta^{j}s_{t+j}, ] since surpluses are procyclical, volatile, and serially correlated like dividends, shouldn’t surpluses generate a stock-like mean return? But surpluses are crucially different from dividends because debt is not equity. A low surplus (s_{t}) raises  our estimate of subsequent surpluses (s_{t+j}). If we separate out
 [b_{t}=s_{t}+E_{t}sum_{j=1}^{infty}beta^{j}s_{t+j}=s_{t}+beta E_{t}b_{t+1}  ] a decline in the “cashflow” (s_{t}) raises the “price” term (b_{t+1}), so the overall return is risk free. Bad cashflow news lowers stock pries, so both cashflow and price terms move in the same direction. In sum a small (a(beta)lt 1) resolves the Jiang et. al. puzzle. (Disclosure, I wrote them about this months ago, so this view is not a surprise. They disagree.)

5) Surpluses and debt. Looking at that last equation, with a positively correlated surplus process (a(beta)>1), as in the AR(1), a surplus today leads to  larger value of the debt tomorrow. A deficit today leads to lower value of the debt tomorrow. The data scream the opposite pattern. Higher deficits raise the value of debt, higher surpluses pay down that debt. Cumby_Canzoneri_Diba (AER 2001) pointed this out 20 years ago and how it indicates an s-shaped surplus process.  An (a(beta)lt 1) solves their puzzle as well. (They viewed (a(beta)lt 1) as inconsistent with fiscal theory which is not the case.)

6) Financing deficits. With (a(beta)geq1), the government finances all of each deficit by inflating away outstanding debt, and more. With (a(beta)=0), the government finances deficits by selling debt. This statement just adds up what’s missing from the last one. If a deficit leads to lower value of the subsequent debt, how did the government finance the deficit? It has to be by inflating away outstanding debt. To see this, look again at inflation, which I write [ frac{B_{t-1}}{P_{t-1}}Delta E_{t}left( frac{P_{t-1}}{P_{t}}right) =Delta E_{t}s_{t}+Delta E_{t}sum_{j=1}^{infty}beta^{j}s_{t+j}=Delta E_{t}s_{t}+Delta E_{t}beta b_{t+1}=1+left[ a(beta)-1right] varepsilon_{t}. ] If (Delta E_{t}s_{t}=varepsilon_{t}) is negative — a deficit — where does that come from? With (a(beta)>1), the second term is also negative. So the deficit, and more, comes from a big inflation on the left hand side, inflating away outstanding debt. If (a(beta)=0), there is no inflation, and the second term on the right side is positive — the deficit is financed by selling additional debt. The data scream this pattern as well.

7) And, perhaps most of all, when the government sells debt, it raises revenue by so doing. How is that possible? Only if investors think that higher surpluses will eventually pay off that debt. Investors think the surplus process is s-shaped.

All of these phenomena are tied together.  You can’t fix one without the others. If you want to fix the mean government bond return by, say, alluding to a liquidity premium for government bonds, you still have a model that predicts tremendously volatile and procyclical bond returns, volatile and countercyclical inflation, deficits financed by inflating away debt, and deficits that lead to lower values of subsequent debt.

So, I think the VAR gives the right sort of estimate. You can quibble with any estimate, but the overall view of the world required for any estimate that produces a large (a(beta)) seems so thoroughly counterfactual it’s beyond rescue. The US has persuaded investors, so far, that when it issues debt it will mostly repay that debt and not inflate it all away.

Yes, a moving average that overshoots is a little unusual. But that’s what we should expect from debt. Borrow today, pay back tomorrow. Finding the opposite, something like the AR(1), would be truly amazing. And in retrospect, amazing that so many papers (including my own) write this down. Well, clarity only comes in hindsight after a lot of hard work and puzzles.

In more general settings (a(beta)) above zero gives a little bit of inflation from fiscal shocks, but there are also time-varying discount rates and long term debt in the present value formula. I leave all that to the book and papers.

(Jiang et al say they tried it with debt in the VAR and claim it doesn’t make much difference.  But their response functions with debt in the VAR, at left,  show even more overshooting than in my example, so I don’t see how they avoid all the predictions of a small (a(beta)), including a low bond premium.)

A lot of literature on fiscal theory and fiscal sustainability, including my own past papers, used AR(1) or similar surplus processes that don’t allow (a(beta)) near zero. I think a lot of the puzzles that literature encountered comes out of this auxiliary specification. Nothing in fiscal theory prohibits a surplus process with (a(beta)=0) and certainly not (0 lt a(beta)lt 1).

Update

Jiang et al. also claim that it is impossible for any government with a unit root in GDP to issue risk free debt. The hidden assumption is easy to root out. Consider the permanent income model, [ c_t = rk_t + r beta sum beta^j y_{t+j}] Consumption is cointegrated with income and the value of debt. Similarly, we would normally write the surplus process [ s_t = alpha b_t + gamma y_t. ] responding to both debt and GDP. If surplus is only cointegrated with GDP, one imposes ( alpha = 0), which amounts to assuming that governments do not repay debts. The surplus should be cointegrated with GDP and with the value of debt.  Governments with unit roots in GDP can indeed promise to repay their debts.



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