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More than Half of All US COVID-19 Deaths Occur in Only Four States

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As of March 24, nearly 30 percent of all the COVID-19 deaths in the United States have occurred in New York state. Of the 910 deaths reported so far in the US, 271 happened in New York. Washington State was in second place, with 13 percent of the nation’s COVID-19 deaths. California comes next with 5.6 percent of all deaths, followed by New Jersey, with 4.8 percent.

In fact, more than fifty percent of all COVID-19 deaths in the US have come from just these four states.

The death rates in New York, New Jersey, and Washington are all sizably higher than in the US overall, as well. The number of deaths per 100,000 in population in New York is six times higher than in the US overall:

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If we were to remove New York, New Jersey, California, and Washington State from the United States altogether, the US’s death rate from Covid-19 would fall by 40 percent, and total cases would fall by 53 percent.

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As with so many statistics, a nationwide statistic for COVID-19 deaths in the US is misleading. As with poverty, life expectancy, and crime, COVID-19 is not evenly distributed throughout the country, and many areas of the country have only been lightly affected so far. As of March 24, 14 states have not reported a single death from COVID-19. Although there is reason to expect some states will yet face sizable increases in cases and deaths, we can’t assume this will happen everywhere. 

Unlike deaths, which are fairly closely monitored for the presence of COVID-19, total cases are mostly unknown. More serious cases tend to get tested while mild cases remain unobserved. Thus, it is possible low case totals are a result of less testing. Yet, we do find the situation with cases is similar to what we’ve seen with deaths. Less than half of all known cases are in the states outside of these New York, New Jersey, California, and Washington. It is plausible that many states reporting few to no deaths really do have few cases and even fewer serious cases.  Moreover, as we have seen internationally, states are likely to differ in death rates due to a variety of factors other than the total number of cases. That is, COVID-19 death rates are not simply a function of total cases.

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It is likely that certain regions on the US continue to be the “hot spots” for the US in terms of the strain on medical resources, while some regions of the US remain far less affected. Nearly all states are likely to face challenges with the spread of the virus, but the fact remains in many states the strain on the medical infrastructure is nothing like we’ve seen in places like New York and Washington State. In New York, for example, we hear stories of how “morgues are full,” and the Pentagon says it plans to set up field hospitals in both New York and Washington State.

Why Lock Down the Entire Nation?

This raises the question of whether it makes sense to lock down the entire country when only certain regions of the nations are heavily impacted at this time. This doesn’t mean, of course, that the rest of the nation should abandon precautions. Persons in all states should continue to adopt precautions, to protect the most at-risk populations, to wear masks, to engage in social distancing when possible, and more.

But given the very real costs of a continued economic shutdown in terms of human lives and increased poverty, it only makes sense that most of the nation take steps to closely observe their available medical resources and engage in precautionary behavior while nonetheless allowing workers to work. At the same time, to limit the spread of infection from the “hot spots,” it would be prudent for less affected states to limit in-migration from areas that are more affected. So far, we have only seen this done on only a very limited basis. In Florida, for example, Governor Ron DeSantis has already imposed quarantine restrictions on travelers from New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut .

It may be that more strict standards would be more helpful in physically separating New York from its neighbors.

Some Australian States Shut their Borders

The few tepid efforts made in this regard in the US can be compared with what has been done in Australia, where the states of South Australia, Western Australia, and Queensland have all closed their borders to travelers from the rest of the nation.

The Australian reports :

From Wednesday night on, anyone entering Queensland from the air or by road will be forced to isolate themselves for 14 days, except freight carriers and essential services.

Last week, the island state of Tasmania closed itself off from from the Australian mainland and imposed a two-week quarantine for new arrivals. Note that these are actions taken by the state governments in Australia, and not by the Australian national government.

State Border Closures vs. a National Shutdown

In the United States, efforts such as those of DeSantis may be on legal shaky ground. Rarely have state governments even attempted to unilaterally close their borders in this manner. One such case was a Colorado governor’s ten-day closure of the state’s border with New Mexico in 1936 . The governor sent the national guard to close the border to keep out unemployed migrant workers. After ten days, the governor reversed his decision thanks to political pressure from within Colorado and New Mexico. No federal court ever ruled on the matter.

US federal courts since the late nineteenth century, however, have claimed border controls are a federal matter only. But, it may be that under present conditions, the courts may find an exception.

Let’s Substitute State Border Control of Nationwide Economic Chaos

I mention all this, of course, not as an ideal policy. Naturally, open borders between states are good for commerce and for freedom in general. The ability to travel freely between political jurisdictions is a basic human right.

But if we are searching the politically palatable changes to the current draconian nationwide government-forced shutdown, substituting state-by-state border control for national impoverishment is a step in the right direction.

As it is, the fact national politicians view the United States as one single unified political jurisdiction is problematic. It means the entire nation is essentially held hostage by the few regions with a large number of serious COVID-19 cases.  At the moment, free movement of persons from state to state — and thus the free spread of the COVID-19 virus — is accepted as a given by policymakers. It is then assumed all states must assume similar policies, and the worst-affected states end up driving policy for everyone else. This reasoning, however, makes far less sense when the most impacted regions can be limited in their access to the rest of the nation.

Note also that it is important these measures be taken only by individual states acting unilaterally. Allowing the central government the prerogative to shut down travel from state to state would be an extremely dangerous move reminiscent of the Lincoln’s wartime measures during the Civil War.  Border-control-focused policy is only an improvement if it leads to greater local control and relaxation of current pandemic measures. Any expansion of national prerogatives and national policy ought to be rejected outright.

(State population data is from the Census Bureau for 2019. All COVID-19 data for this article was gathered from Worldometer data for March 24. For more on decentralization of policy as applied to pandemics, see: “How Would “President Rothbard” Keep Out the Zika Virus?” by Ryan McMaken.)



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Economy

Cases and Deaths from Coronavirus Doubling Every Three Days Is Very Bad News Indeed

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I confess I am positively unmanned by the every-three-days doubling of reported cases and deaths here in the United States. I had thought that we would see true cases doubling every seven days. And back when reported cases started doubling every three days, I was encouraged, because I thought it meant that we were catching up on testing, and so getting closer to detecting the bulk of the symptomatic cases.

But now it looks like that was wrong: reported cases were doubling every three days because true cases were doubling every three days—that is what deaths tell us was happening to true cases up until three weeks ago. The lack of case curve-bending makes me think that testing is not improving. It makes me think that reported cases are doubling every three days because true cases are doubling every three days.

That means that the Trump administration has only 40% as much time to get its ass in gear as I thought it did.

And that means the chances it will are very very low indeed:

I must confess it had never occurred to me back when China shut down Wuhan that we would simply not test everyone who presented with symptoms—and then backtrace their contacts. It is really looking now as though China—even with its authoritarian blindness fumbling of the intitial response (see Zeynep Tufekci: https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2020/02/coronavirus-and-blindness-authoritarianism/606922/ is going to be studied in the future as a positive model of public health in the 21st century, while the Trump Administration’s reaction—currently on track as the worst in the world in handling coronavirus <https://www.evernote.com/l/AAFzPq9AJoFHFr_nrTPi1QyseD8WSAe0y00B/image.png>—will be studied in the future as a negative example: Brad DeLong: The Trump Administration’s Epic COVID-19 Failure https://www.bradford-delong.com/2020/03/the-trump-administrations-epic-covid-19-failure-project-syndicate.html: 'As officials at the US Centers for Disease Control and other public-health bodies surely must have recognized, asymptomatic transmission means that the standard method of quarantining symptomatic travelers when they cross national (or provincial) borders is insufficient. It also means that we have known for almost two months that we were playing a long game against the virus. With its spread more or less inevitable, the primary task was always to reduce the pace of community transmission as much as possible, so that health-care systems would not be overwhelmed before a vaccine could be developed, tested, and deployed. In the long game against a contagious virus, how to mitigate transmission is no secret. In Singapore, which has largely contained the outbreak within its borders, all travelers from abroad have been required to self-quarantine for 14 days, regardless of whether they have symptoms. In Japan, South Korea, and other countries, testing for COVID-19 has been conducted on a massive scale. These are the measures that responsible governments take. You test as many people as you can, and when you locate areas of community transmission, you lock them down. At the same time, you build a database of all those who have already developed immunity and thus may safely resume their normal routine…


#coronavirus #highlighted #orangehairedbaboons #publichealth #2020-03-27



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How not to lose your mind in the Covid-19 age

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here are as many responses to the Covid-19 pandemic as there are people to respond. Some have of us have children to home-school. Some of us have elderly relatives to worry about; some of us are the elderly relatives in question. Some of us have never been busier; others have already lost their jobs.

One experience is common, however: wherever the virus has started to spread, life is changing radically for almost everyone. It’s a strange and anxious time, and some of the anxiety is inevitable. For many people, however, much of the stress can be soothed with – if you will pardon the phrase – one weird trick.

First, a diagnosis. Most of us, consciously or not, have a long list of things to do. At the virus and the lockdowns have spread, many of the items on the to-do list have simply evaporated. At the same time, a swarm of new tasks have appeared, multiplying by the day: everything from the small-yet-unfamiliar (“get toilet paper” and “claim refund on cancelled holiday”) to the huge-and-intimidating (“organise an inspiring home-school curriculum” or “find a new job”).

The change is so fast and comprehensive that for most of us it is unprecedented. Even a divorce or an international relocation is more gradual. The death of a spouse might be the only experience that comes close. No wonder that even those of us who are safe and well and feel loved and financially secure find ourselves reeling at the scale of it all.

To the extent that the problem is that the to-do list is unrecognisable, the solution is oddly simple: get the to-list back in order. Here’s how.

Get a piece of paper. Make a list of all the projects that are on your mind. David Allen, author of the cult productivity manual Getting Things Done, defines a project as “any multistep outcome that can be completed within a year”. So, yes: anything from trying to source your weekly groceries to publishing a book.

That list should have three kinds of projects on it.

First, there are the old projects that make no sense in the new world. For those that can be mothballed until next year, write them down and file them away. Others will disappear forever. Say your goodbyes. Some part of your subconscious may have been clinging on, and I’m going to guess that ten seconds of acknowledging that the project has been obliterated will save on a vague sense of unease in the long run.

Second, there are the existing projects, some of which have become more complicated in the mid-pandemic world. Things that you might previously have done on automatic may now require a little thought. Again, a few moments with a pen and paper will often tell you all you need to know: what’s changed? What do I now need to do? What, specifically, is my next action? Write it down.

Third, there are brand new projects. For me, for example, I need to rewrite the introduction to my forthcoming book (‘How To Make The World Add Up, since you were wondering). It’s going to seem mighty strange without coronavirus references in it. Many of us need to devote more than a little attention to the sudden appearance of our children at home. Some of us need to hunt for new work; others, for a better home-office set-up. Many of us are now volunteering to look after vulnerable neighbours.  In each case, the drill is the same: sketch out the project, ask yourself what the very next step is, and write it down.

Occasionally, you may encounter something that’s on your mind – the fate of western civilisation, for example, or the fact that the health service desperately needs more ventilators and more protective equipment. For my family, it’s an elderly relative, suffering from dementia, in a locked-down nursing home. We can’t visit him. He can’t communicate on the phone or comprehend a video chat. There is, for now, literally nothing we can do but wait and hope. Acknowledging that fact – that there is no action to be taken – is itself a useful step.

I won’t pretend that in this frightening time, working through your to do list in a systematic way will resolve all anxieties. It won’t. But you may be surprised at how much mental energy it saves – and at the feeling of relief as all these confusing and barely-acknowledged new responsibilities take shape and feel more under your control.

Or so it seems to me. Good luck, and keep safe.

 

Oh – and in case it wasn’t obvious, this week’s Book of the Week is David Allen’s superb Getting Things Done.

My NEW book The Next Fifty Things That Made the Modern Economy is out in the UK in May and available to pre-order; please consider doing so online or at your local bookshop – pre-orders help other people find the book and are a huge help.

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Guest Contribution: “Banks on the Brink”

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Today we are fortunate to be able to present a guest contribution written by Mark Copelovitch  (University of Wisconsin – Madison) and David Singer (MIT).


“The peculiar essence of our financial system is an unprecedented trust between man and man; and when that trust is much weakened by hidden causes, a small accident may greatly hurt it, and a great accident for a moment may almost destroy it.” –Walter Bagehot (1873), Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market, pp.158-9.

Why do banking crises occur? In our new book, Banks on the Brink: Global Capital Securities Markets, and the Political Roots of Financial Crises, we seek to understand why some countries are more prone to banking crises than other countries or at different times.

At the simplest level, banks collapse because customers lose trust in them. Trust is ubiquitous in the financial system. Banks trust that customers will repay their loans. Depositors trust that banks will manage their money carefully. And banks trust other banks to provide liquidity and to remain standing day after day. But as Walter Bagehot noted in his famed account of London’s 1866 financial panic, trust in the financial system can erode from “hidden causes.” When trust is weakened, even seemingly small accidents—like the collapse of London bank Overend, Gurney, and Company, which triggered the 1866 panic—can cause systemic financial crises.

The details of individual banking crises vary, but rarely does trust in the banking system evaporate without due cause.  In the Panic of 1907, banks collapsed because they were complicit in speculation and market manipulation that led to massive financial losses. During the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, the trigger for the collapse of Thai banks was speculative lending to real estate developers, which led to a boom and bust in the real estate market. And in 2008, after a decade of easy mortgages to borrowers with shaky credit histories and a growing bubble in the real estate market, investors grew fearful that banks and holders of mortgage-backed securities might never get their money back.

Our book highlights two key triggers of banking crises. The first, levels of foreign capital inflows, sets the stage for potential distortions in the financial system. Large capital inflows have been found to be a consistent correlate of banking crises. Indeed, many scholars believe that the malignancy of global capital flows is the most likely culprit behind banking crises.  In Lost Decades, their analysis of the Great Recession, Chinn and Frieden (2011) point to the enduring prevalence of the capital flow cycle, in which “capital floods into a country, stimulates an economic boom, encourages high-flying financial and other activities, and eventually culminates in a crash.” They note that many previous crises fit this pattern, including the Mexican and Asian crises in the 1990s, and dozens of others.  Reinhart and Rogoff, in this This Time is Different (2009), suggest that the pattern has deep historical roots. One of their key findings, backed by data covering 800 years of financial crises, is that large current account deficits, asset price bubbles, and excessive sovereign borrowing are common precursors of crises across space and time.  Moreover, bank failures were relatively rare during the Bretton Woods monetary system from the end of World War II to the early 1970s, when governments enacted strict controls on capital movements (Helleiner 1994). This overall finding—that foreign capital opens up a Pandora’s Box of financial distortions—now has the status of conventional wisdom in academic and policy circles.

The potential dangers of capital inflows are real. But existing research has failed to emphasize that foreign capital is not always destabilizing for the banking system. For every instance of a banking crisis preceded by large capital inflows, there are countless examples where inflows are harmlessly—and even productively— channeled throughout the national financial system.  For example, while the U.K. and the U.S. both experienced large current account deficits in the years preceding the Great Recession. Australia and New Zealand also experienced substantial current account deficits, but their banking systems escaped relatively unscathed.

Why do capital inflows lead to banking crises in some cases but not in others? To explain this, we focus on a second variable: national financial market structure. We argue that the substantial variation in the relative prominence of banks versus securities markets (Figure 1) determines whether capital inflows are channeled safely and productively through the national economy, or whether they instead cause banks to take on excessive risks and increase the likelihood of a financial crisis.  Banks often sit alongside other financial institutions, including stock and bond markets, which provide alternative sources of financing for borrowers and alternative investments for savers. When banks are conservative because of the relative absence of competition for financial intermediation, foreign capital can be safely channeled into the system without causing bank instability. On the other hand, when banks sit alongside viable securities markets, capital inflows exacerbate banks’ risk taking and increase the probability of a crisis.

Figure 1: Market/bank ratio, OECD countries, average, 1990-2011

Source: World Bank Global Financial Development Database, calculated as the ratio of stock market trading volume to total bank lending

To test our argument, we analyze data from the 1970s through the early 21st century for most of the world’s developed economies. Figure 2 illustrates the core result of our statistical analysis: capital inflows are only correlated with banking crises under certain conditions – namely, when they flow into a financial system in which commercial banks compete alongside large and highly-developed securities markets.

Figure 2: Average Conditional Marginal Effect of Gross Portfolio Capital Inflows on Probability of a Banking Crisis, by Market/Bank Ratio (World Bank banking crisis classification), 1970-2011

Coefficient on change in gross portfolio inflows (%  of trend GDP, 5-year moving average)

In this book, we not only explore the determinants of banking crises, we also explore how capital inflows and financial market structure interact to affect banks’ risk taking. The conventional wisdom linking capital inflows to crises emphasizes distortions in the allocation of capital as it is channeled through banks and other intermediaries (Portes 2009).  The question is precisely how this plays out and which distortions are most salient.  Some scholars find a clear link between capital inflows and the volume of credit.  For example, Schularick et. al. (2012), in their groundbreaking work on the long-term patterns of financial instability in industrialized countries, find that 1) domestic credit growth is the single most important determinant of banking crises; and 2) capital inflows, as measured by current account deficits, go hand-in-hand with credit booms, especially in the post-Bretton Woods era.  In contrast, other scholars, such as Amri et. al. (2016), find only a weak relationship between capital inflows and domestic credit growth and notes that this connection is diminishing over the last two decades.

If capital inflows lead to banking crises by triggering changes in the volume of domestic lending, then we should find a similar conditional, interactive relationship between capital inflows, financial market structure, and credit growth as we did with banking crises.  However, we find no such relationship – either unconditionally or conditionally – between capital inflows and the growth rate of domestic bank credit.  While capital inflows are conditionally correlated with banking crises, the relationship does not appear to operate through a simple increase in the volume of bank loans.  Rather, credit booms appear to be a separate channel of financial instability from the one we identify in our analysis.

In contrast, we do find evidence that capital inflows influence the propensity of banks to take on greater risk, through a reduction in capital cushions and/or the assumption of greater insolvency risk – and that this varies depending on a country’s domestic financial market structure. In other words, capital inflows – in financial systems where banks complete alongside large securities markets – affect the quality of bank lending and the composition of bank balance sheets.

Figure 3 illustrates this second core result. It shows the conditional relationship between capital inflows, market structure, and national level averages of Tier 1 commercial bank capital.  These results strongly suggest that capital inflows trigger banking crises not because they cause credit booms (surges in the volume of bank lending), but because they lead banks to reduce their capital holdings and lend to more risky customers.  This decline in the quality of banks’ loan portfolios, rather than an increase in the number and amount of loans, appears to be the “smoking gun” linking capital inflows to banking crises in industrialized countries.

 Figure 3: Average Conditional Marginal Effect of Gross Portfolio Inflows (% trend GDP) on Tier 1 Commercial Bank Capital Ratio, by Market/Bank Ratio

Coefficient on change in gross portfolio inflows (%  of trend GDP)

The political roots of financial market structure

While our statistical analysis shows that financial market structure mediates the effects of foreign capital inflows, it cannot explain how such variation in market structure developed in the first place. To resolve this puzzle, we turn to historical analysis, zeroing in on the political decisions that shape the structure of financial markets that make certain countries especially vulnerable to banking crises. Through detailed historical case studies of Canada and Germany, Banks on the Brink shows how seemingly innocuous political decisions about financial rules can accumulate over decades and solidify a country’s financial market structure for generations.

In our case study of Canada, we show that the country’s remarkable history of bank stability has been attributable in part to its equally remarkable fragmented and underdeveloped stock markets. The Canadian Constitution granted the national government the sole authority to regulate the banking industry, but authority over stock markets was relegated to the provinces. During the economic crisis of the early 1930s, while the U.S. government seized the opportunity to create a national securities regulator and to minimize the role of state regulatory agencies, Canada made few changes to its regulatory system. The government took no steps to create a national regulator, instead reaffirming the authority of the provinces to supervise their stock exchanges in accordance with their particular needs. To this day, Canada is the only industrialized country without a national securities regulator. We argue that the country’s underdeveloped securities markets have had a salutary effect on its banks, which have been successful in channeling foreign capital to borrowers over the last four decades without taking on undue risk.

Like Canada, Germany has a long history of bank stability, but it has recently taken a dangerous turn. Our case study highlights how policy decisions in the aftermath of two major financial crises—the Panic of 1873 and the crisis of 1931—arrested the development of German securities markets and solidified a heavily bank-centric financial system. Interest-group and party politics, rising nationalism and anti-Semitism in the late 19th century, and the Nazis’ ascendance to power in the 1930s all conspired to hobble the development of German stock markets prior to World War II, allowing banks to engage in long-term conservative lending with “patient capital” throughout the postwar era until the 1980s. In recent years, however, financial competitors from within and outside Germany have prompted the large German banks to seek alternative sources of revenue. Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, and other large banks have become champions of Finanzplatz Deutschland, a single large securities market designed to compete with New York and London. As this market has developed, the conservative bias of German banks has eroded, and many required emergency bailouts in the early 21st century.

Key implications

Banks on the Brink shows that politics is the root cause of financial crises, but not in the way that many observers might imagine. Bankers themselves have political preferences and may express them publicly, and some banks lobby for favorable public policies and donate to political campaigns and political action committees. But at a deeper level, banks are embedded in financial markets, which themselves reflect an accumulation of government choices. Banks today operate in an environment shaped by these political choices, some of which make banks more resilient, others of which make them more prone to crisis. This variation, across space and time, explains why some countries find themselves more vulnerable to banking crises and the dangers of foreign capital inflows than others.

These findings have key policy implications for how to minimize the risk of banking crises in the U.S. and elsewhere. In light of the slow-moving nature of financial market structure, any policy proposal to fundamentally alter the shape and depth of financial markets will likely be dead on arrival. Proposals to re-introduce Glass-Steagall-type regulations which separate commercial and investment banking might be episodically popular in countries like the U.S., but as our evidence suggests, they would fail to address the underlying reasons for banks’ excessive risk taking. We also argue against capital controls. Instead, we suggest that regulators should focus their efforts are tightening bank capital requirements, especially in financial systems with prominent or growing securities markets.  Governments are unlikely to be able or willing to fundamentally alter the structure of domestic financial markets in the short- or medium-term. But they can ensure that financial institutions act more prudently, especially when foreign capital inflows flood into the country and the temptation for  banks to engage in more risky behavior is greatest.

 


 

This post written by Mark Copelovitch and David Singer.



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