Connect with us

Economy

More than Half of All US COVID-19 Deaths Occur in Only Four States

Published

on


As of March 24, nearly 30 percent of all the COVID-19 deaths in the United States have occurred in New York state. Of the 910 deaths reported so far in the US, 271 happened in New York. Washington State was in second place, with 13 percent of the nation’s COVID-19 deaths. California comes next with 5.6 percent of all deaths, followed by New Jersey, with 4.8 percent.

In fact, more than fifty percent of all COVID-19 deaths in the US have come from just these four states.

The death rates in New York, New Jersey, and Washington are all sizably higher than in the US overall, as well. The number of deaths per 100,000 in population in New York is six times higher than in the US overall:

ny

If we were to remove New York, New Jersey, California, and Washington State from the United States altogether, the US’s death rate from Covid-19 would fall by 40 percent, and total cases would fall by 53 percent.

ny

As with so many statistics, a nationwide statistic for COVID-19 deaths in the US is misleading. As with poverty, life expectancy, and crime, COVID-19 is not evenly distributed throughout the country, and many areas of the country have only been lightly affected so far. As of March 24, 14 states have not reported a single death from COVID-19. Although there is reason to expect some states will yet face sizable increases in cases and deaths, we can’t assume this will happen everywhere. 

Unlike deaths, which are fairly closely monitored for the presence of COVID-19, total cases are mostly unknown. More serious cases tend to get tested while mild cases remain unobserved. Thus, it is possible low case totals are a result of less testing. Yet, we do find the situation with cases is similar to what we’ve seen with deaths. Less than half of all known cases are in the states outside of these New York, New Jersey, California, and Washington. It is plausible that many states reporting few to no deaths really do have few cases and even fewer serious cases.  Moreover, as we have seen internationally, states are likely to differ in death rates due to a variety of factors other than the total number of cases. That is, COVID-19 death rates are not simply a function of total cases.

ny

It is likely that certain regions on the US continue to be the “hot spots” for the US in terms of the strain on medical resources, while some regions of the US remain far less affected. Nearly all states are likely to face challenges with the spread of the virus, but the fact remains in many states the strain on the medical infrastructure is nothing like we’ve seen in places like New York and Washington State. In New York, for example, we hear stories of how “morgues are full,” and the Pentagon says it plans to set up field hospitals in both New York and Washington State.

Why Lock Down the Entire Nation?

This raises the question of whether it makes sense to lock down the entire country when only certain regions of the nations are heavily impacted at this time. This doesn’t mean, of course, that the rest of the nation should abandon precautions. Persons in all states should continue to adopt precautions, to protect the most at-risk populations, to wear masks, to engage in social distancing when possible, and more.

But given the very real costs of a continued economic shutdown in terms of human lives and increased poverty, it only makes sense that most of the nation take steps to closely observe their available medical resources and engage in precautionary behavior while nonetheless allowing workers to work. At the same time, to limit the spread of infection from the “hot spots,” it would be prudent for less affected states to limit in-migration from areas that are more affected. So far, we have only seen this done on only a very limited basis. In Florida, for example, Governor Ron DeSantis has already imposed quarantine restrictions on travelers from New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut .

It may be that more strict standards would be more helpful in physically separating New York from its neighbors.

Some Australian States Shut their Borders

The few tepid efforts made in this regard in the US can be compared with what has been done in Australia, where the states of South Australia, Western Australia, and Queensland have all closed their borders to travelers from the rest of the nation.

The Australian reports :

From Wednesday night on, anyone entering Queensland from the air or by road will be forced to isolate themselves for 14 days, except freight carriers and essential services.

Last week, the island state of Tasmania closed itself off from from the Australian mainland and imposed a two-week quarantine for new arrivals. Note that these are actions taken by the state governments in Australia, and not by the Australian national government.

State Border Closures vs. a National Shutdown

In the United States, efforts such as those of DeSantis may be on legal shaky ground. Rarely have state governments even attempted to unilaterally close their borders in this manner. One such case was a Colorado governor’s ten-day closure of the state’s border with New Mexico in 1936 . The governor sent the national guard to close the border to keep out unemployed migrant workers. After ten days, the governor reversed his decision thanks to political pressure from within Colorado and New Mexico. No federal court ever ruled on the matter.

US federal courts since the late nineteenth century, however, have claimed border controls are a federal matter only. But, it may be that under present conditions, the courts may find an exception.

Let’s Substitute State Border Control of Nationwide Economic Chaos

I mention all this, of course, not as an ideal policy. Naturally, open borders between states are good for commerce and for freedom in general. The ability to travel freely between political jurisdictions is a basic human right.

But if we are searching the politically palatable changes to the current draconian nationwide government-forced shutdown, substituting state-by-state border control for national impoverishment is a step in the right direction.

As it is, the fact national politicians view the United States as one single unified political jurisdiction is problematic. It means the entire nation is essentially held hostage by the few regions with a large number of serious COVID-19 cases.  At the moment, free movement of persons from state to state — and thus the free spread of the COVID-19 virus — is accepted as a given by policymakers. It is then assumed all states must assume similar policies, and the worst-affected states end up driving policy for everyone else. This reasoning, however, makes far less sense when the most impacted regions can be limited in their access to the rest of the nation.

Note also that it is important these measures be taken only by individual states acting unilaterally. Allowing the central government the prerogative to shut down travel from state to state would be an extremely dangerous move reminiscent of the Lincoln’s wartime measures during the Civil War.  Border-control-focused policy is only an improvement if it leads to greater local control and relaxation of current pandemic measures. Any expansion of national prerogatives and national policy ought to be rejected outright.

(State population data is from the Census Bureau for 2019. All COVID-19 data for this article was gathered from Worldometer data for March 24. For more on decentralization of policy as applied to pandemics, see: “How Would “President Rothbard” Keep Out the Zika Virus?” by Ryan McMaken.)



Source link

قالب وردپرس

Continue Reading
Click to comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Economy

The Deficit Myth: a review

Published

on


One common objection to neoclassical economics is that it underweights the importance of history and class. It is therefore paradoxical that Stephanie Kelton's The Deficit Myth, which claims to challenge orthodox economics, should be guilty of just these vices.

Let's start by saying that I wholly agree with the main claims she makes – that a government which enjoys monetary sovereignty can always finance its borrowing. Asking how we will pay for public spending is therefore daft. Instead, the question, as Dr Kelton says, is: can the extra spending be resourced? The constraint on raising health spending for example – if there is one – is a lack of doctors and nurses, not a lack of finance. Where there are resources lying idle, governments should raise spending to employ them. Dr Kelton explain these ideas wonderfully clearly, so I recommend this book to all non-economists interested in government finances.

For this economist, though, it poses a problem. I remember writing a research note for Nomura back in the early 90s arguing that increased government borrowing would not increase gilt yields because the same increased private saving that was the counterpart of government borrowing would easily finance that borrowing. Nominal gilt yields, I said, were determined much more by inflation than by government borrowing. But nobody accused me of originality. And rightly so. I was simply channelling Kalecki, Beveridge, Lerner and Keynes, who famously said back in 1933:

Look after the unemployment, and the Budget will look after itself.

For me, Kelton is – albeit very lucidly – reinventing the wheel. Reading her, I felt like Mr Jourdain in Moliere's The Bourgeois Gentleman, who was surprised to discover that he had been speaking prose all his life.

Here, Dr Kelton is more ambiguous than I would like. At one stage she claims that MMT "didn't exist" before the late 90s. But whilst the phrase did not exist, the ideas certainly did. Randall Wray is right to say (pdf) that "the main principles of functional finance were relatively widely held in the immediate postwar period."

And indeed Kelton does occasionally see this. There is passing reference to Lerner and to Keynes' How to Pay for the War, though not to Kalecki. And she cites JFK agreeing with James Tobin saying that "the only limit [on government borrowing] really is inflation."

Which is why I say she underplays history. I agree with Gavin Jackson that MMT is not new, and with Hans Despain that she neglects the ontology of MMT. We must ask, as she doesn't: why did these old truths get forgotten*?

I'm not sure about Wray's explanation, that it was because of the inflation of the 1970s. In principle, we might have interpreted that as consistent with functional finance, except that the inflation constraint on borrowing had tightened since the 50s.

Instead, I suspect the answer lies in Kalecki's great paper (pdf), "Political Aspects of Full Employment", written in 1942. He starts by saying "we are all 'MMTers' now":

A solid majority of economists is now of the opinion that, even in a capitalist system, full employment may be secured by a Government spending programme, provided there is in existence adequate plant to employ all existing labour power, and provided adequate supplies of necessary foreign raw materials may be obtained in exchange for exports.

What's not to like, he asks? His answer lay in something else Kelton neglects: class.

Capitalists, he wrote, disliked what we now call MMT because it weakened their power. If governments can use fiscal policy to maintain full employment, they don't need to maintain business confidence and so "this powerful controlling device loses its effectiveness":

The social function of the doctrine of "sound finance" is to make the level of employment dependent on the "state of confidence…[Capitalists'] class instinct tells them that lasting full employment is unsound from their point of view and that unemployment is an integral part of the " normal " capitalist system.

It is surely no accident that the backlash against functional finance came at a time when capitalists re-asserted their power over governments. Nor is it an accident that it's happened when capitalism has shifted away from mass-market Fordism to extractive finance capital: the former requires full employment and a mass market, the latter requires cheap money instead.

The analogy between government and household finances is of course a fiction – as we've known for almost a century – but it is a useful fiction for maintaining capitalists power.

Which is a big gap in Kelton's analysis. In treating public finances as merely a technocratic matter, she is ignoring the fact that capitalist power sometimes precludes good policy. She is making the error Kalecki warned us against:

The assumption that a government will maintain full employment in a capitalist economy if it only knows how to do it is fallacious.

Kelton is right. To implement her ideas (and those of Kalecki, Keynes, Lerner, Beveridge and Minskly!) however requires more than an intellectual (counter-)revolution. It requires a dismantling of capitalist power. And that's a tougher job.

* She neglects another historical question: if monetary sovereignty is as good as she claims, why were European nations (with the support of both public and economists) so keen to abandon it in the 1990s? One answer, I suspect, is that countries lacking the US's "exorbitant privilege" had less effective sovereignty. Whereas demand for Treasuries and dollars is so great as to give the US room to borrow, demand for drachmas, escudos and lira was not so great – and the dumping of such currencies meant their governments faced a tighter inflation constraint than the US.



Source link

قالب وردپرس

Continue Reading

Economy

The Surplus Process

Published

on



How should we model surpluses and deficits? In finishing up a recent articleand chapter 5 and 6 of a Fiscal Theory of the Price Level update, a bunch of observations coalesced that are worth passing on in blog post form.

Background: The real value of nominal government debt equals the present value of real primary surpluses, [ frac{B_{t-1}}{P_{t}}=b_{t}=E_{t}sum_{j=0}^{infty}beta^{j}s_{t+j}. ] I ‘m going to use one-period nominal debt and a constant discount rate for simplicity. In the fiscal theory of the price level, the (B) and (s) decisions cause inflation (P). In other theories, the Fed is in charge of (P), and (s) adjusts passively. This distinction does not matter for this discussion. This equation and all the issues in this blog post hold in both fiscal and standard theories.

The question is, what is a reasonable time-series process for (left{s_{t}right} ) consistent with the debt valuation formula? Here are surpluses

The blue line is the NIPA surplus/GDP ratio. The red line is my preferred measure of primary surplus/GDP, and the green line is the NIPA primary surplus/GDP.

The surplus process is persistent and strongly procyclical, strongly correlated with the unemployment rate.  (The picture is debt to GDP and surplus to GDP ratios, but the same present value identity holds with small modifications so for a blog post I won’t add extra notation.)

Something like an AR(1) quickly springs to mind, [ s_{t+1}=rho_{s}s_{t}+varepsilon_{t+1}. ] The main point of this blog post is that this is a terrible, though common, specification.

Write a general MA process, [ s_{t}=a(L)varepsilon_{t}. ] The question is, what’s a reasonable (a(L)?) To that end, look at the innovation version of the present value equation, [ frac{B_{t-1}}{P_{t-1}}Delta E_{t}left( frac{P_{t-1}}{P_{t}}right) =Delta E_{t}sum_{j=0}^{infty}beta^{j}s_{t+j}=sum_{j=0}^{infty}beta ^{j}a_{j}varepsilon_{t}=a(beta)varepsilon_{t}% ] where [ Delta E_{t}=E_{t}-E_{t-1}. ] The weighted some of moving average coefficients (a(beta)) controls the relationship between unexpected inflation and surplus shocks. If (a(beta)) is large, then small surplus shocks correspond to a lot of inflation and vice versa. For the AR(1), (a(beta)=1/(1-rho_{s}beta)approx 2.) Unexpected inflation is twice as volatile as unexpected surplus/deficits.

(a(beta)) captures how much of a deficit is repaid. Consider (a(beta)=0). Since (a_{0}=1), this means that the moving average is s-shaped. For any (a(beta)lt 1), the moving average coefficients must eventually change sign. (a(beta)=0) is the case that all debts are repaid. If (varepsilon_{t}=-1), then eventually surpluses rise to pay off the initial debt, and there is no change to the discounted sum of surpluses. Your debt obeys (a(beta)=0) if you do not default. If you borrow money to buy a house, you have deficits today, but then a string of positive surpluses which pay off the debt with interest.

The MA(1) is a good simple example, [ s_{t}=varepsilon_{t}+thetavarepsilon_{t-1}% ] Here (a(beta)=1+thetabeta). For (a(beta)=0), you need (theta=-beta ^{-1}=-R). The debt -(varepsilon_{t}) is repaid with interest (R).

Let’s look at an estimate. I ran a VAR of surplus and value of debt (v), and I also ran an AR(1).

Here are the response functions to a deficit shock:

The blue solid line with (s=-0.31) comes from a larger VAR, not shown here. The dashed line comes from the two variable VAR, and the line with triangles comes from the AR(1).

The VAR (dashed line) shows a slight s shape. The moving average coefficients gently turn positive. But when you add it up, those overshootings bring us back to (a(beta)=0.26) despite 5 years of negative responses. (I use (beta=1)). The AR(1) version without debt has (a(beta)=2.21), a factor of 10 larger!

Clearly, whether you include debt in a VAR and find a slightly overshooting moving average, or leave debt out of the VAR and find something like an AR(1) makes a major difference. Which is right? Just as obviously, looking at (R^2)   and t-statistics of the one-step ahead regressions is not going to sort this out.

I now get to the point.

Here are 7 related observations that I think collectively push us to the view that (a(beta)) should be a quite small number. The observations use this very simple model with one period debt and a constant discount rate, but the size and magnitude of the puzzles are so strong that even I don’t think time-varying discount rates can overturn them. If so, well, all the more power to the time-varying discount rate! Again, these observations hold equally for active or passive fiscal policy. This is not about FTPL, at least directly.

1) The correlation of deficits and inflation. Reminder, [ frac{B_{t-1}}{P_{t-1}}Delta E_{t}left( frac{P_{t-1}}{P_{t}}right) =a(beta)varepsilon_{t}. ] If we have an AR(1), (a(beta)=1/(1-rho_{s}beta)approx2), and with (sigma(varepsilon)approx5%) in my little VAR, the AR(1) produces 10% inflation in response to a 1 standard deviation deficit shock. We should see 10% unanticipated inflation in recessions! We see if anything slightly less inflation in recessions, and little correlation of inflation with deficits overall. (a(beta)) near zero solves that puzzle.

2) Inflation volatility. The AR(1) likewise predicts that unexpected inflation has about 10% volatility. Unexpected inflation has about 1% volatility. This observation on its own suggests (a(beta)) no larger than 0.2.

3) Bond return volatility and cyclical correlation. The one-year treasury bill is (so far) completely safe in nominal terms. Thus the volatility and cyclical correlation of unexpected inflation is also the volatility and cyclical correlation of real treasury bill returns. The AR(1) predicts that one-year bonds have a standard deviation of returns around 10%, and they lose in recessions, when the AR(1) predicts a big inflation. In fact one-year treasury bills have no more than 1% standard deviation, and do better in recessions.

4) Mean bond returns. In the AR(1) model, bonds have a stock-like volatility and move procyclically. They should have a stock-like mean return and risk premium. In fact, bonds have low volatility and have if anything a negative cyclical beta so yield if anything less than the risk free rate. A small  (a(beta)) generates low bond mean returns as well.

Jiang, Lustig, Van Nieuwerburgh and Xiaolan recently raised this puzzle, using a VAR estimate of the surplus process that generates a high (a(beta)). Looking at the valuation formula [ frac{B_{t-1}}{P_{t}}=E_{t}sum_{j=0}^{infty}beta^{j}s_{t+j}, ] since surpluses are procyclical, volatile, and serially correlated like dividends, shouldn’t surpluses generate a stock-like mean return? But surpluses are crucially different from dividends because debt is not equity. A low surplus (s_{t}) raises  our estimate of subsequent surpluses (s_{t+j}). If we separate out
 [b_{t}=s_{t}+E_{t}sum_{j=1}^{infty}beta^{j}s_{t+j}=s_{t}+beta E_{t}b_{t+1}  ] a decline in the “cashflow” (s_{t}) raises the “price” term (b_{t+1}), so the overall return is risk free. Bad cashflow news lowers stock pries, so both cashflow and price terms move in the same direction. In sum a small (a(beta)lt 1) resolves the Jiang et. al. puzzle. (Disclosure, I wrote them about this months ago, so this view is not a surprise. They disagree.)

5) Surpluses and debt. Looking at that last equation, with a positively correlated surplus process (a(beta)>1), as in the AR(1), a surplus today leads to  larger value of the debt tomorrow. A deficit today leads to lower value of the debt tomorrow. The data scream the opposite pattern. Higher deficits raise the value of debt, higher surpluses pay down that debt. Cumby_Canzoneri_Diba (AER 2001) pointed this out 20 years ago and how it indicates an s-shaped surplus process.  An (a(beta)lt 1) solves their puzzle as well. (They viewed (a(beta)lt 1) as inconsistent with fiscal theory which is not the case.)

6) Financing deficits. With (a(beta)geq1), the government finances all of each deficit by inflating away outstanding debt, and more. With (a(beta)=0), the government finances deficits by selling debt. This statement just adds up what’s missing from the last one. If a deficit leads to lower value of the subsequent debt, how did the government finance the deficit? It has to be by inflating away outstanding debt. To see this, look again at inflation, which I write [ frac{B_{t-1}}{P_{t-1}}Delta E_{t}left( frac{P_{t-1}}{P_{t}}right) =Delta E_{t}s_{t}+Delta E_{t}sum_{j=1}^{infty}beta^{j}s_{t+j}=Delta E_{t}s_{t}+Delta E_{t}beta b_{t+1}=1+left[ a(beta)-1right] varepsilon_{t}. ] If (Delta E_{t}s_{t}=varepsilon_{t}) is negative — a deficit — where does that come from? With (a(beta)>1), the second term is also negative. So the deficit, and more, comes from a big inflation on the left hand side, inflating away outstanding debt. If (a(beta)=0), there is no inflation, and the second term on the right side is positive — the deficit is financed by selling additional debt. The data scream this pattern as well.

7) And, perhaps most of all, when the government sells debt, it raises revenue by so doing. How is that possible? Only if investors think that higher surpluses will eventually pay off that debt. Investors think the surplus process is s-shaped.

All of these phenomena are tied together.  You can’t fix one without the others. If you want to fix the mean government bond return by, say, alluding to a liquidity premium for government bonds, you still have a model that predicts tremendously volatile and procyclical bond returns, volatile and countercyclical inflation, deficits financed by inflating away debt, and deficits that lead to lower values of subsequent debt.

So, I think the VAR gives the right sort of estimate. You can quibble with any estimate, but the overall view of the world required for any estimate that produces a large (a(beta)) seems so thoroughly counterfactual it’s beyond rescue. The US has persuaded investors, so far, that when it issues debt it will mostly repay that debt and not inflate it all away.

Yes, a moving average that overshoots is a little unusual. But that’s what we should expect from debt. Borrow today, pay back tomorrow. Finding the opposite, something like the AR(1), would be truly amazing. And in retrospect, amazing that so many papers (including my own) write this down. Well, clarity only comes in hindsight after a lot of hard work and puzzles.

In more general settings (a(beta)) above zero gives a little bit of inflation from fiscal shocks, but there are also time-varying discount rates and long term debt in the present value formula. I leave all that to the book and papers.

(Jiang et al say they tried it with debt in the VAR and claim it doesn’t make much difference.  But their response functions with debt in the VAR, at left,  show even more overshooting than in my example, so I don’t see how they avoid all the predictions of a small (a(beta)), including a low bond premium.)

A lot of literature on fiscal theory and fiscal sustainability, including my own past papers, used AR(1) or similar surplus processes that don’t allow (a(beta)) near zero. I think a lot of the puzzles that literature encountered comes out of this auxiliary specification. Nothing in fiscal theory prohibits a surplus process with (a(beta)=0) and certainly not (0 lt a(beta)lt 1).

Update

Jiang et al. also claim that it is impossible for any government with a unit root in GDP to issue risk free debt. The hidden assumption is easy to root out. Consider the permanent income model, [ c_t = rk_t + r beta sum beta^j y_{t+j}] Consumption is cointegrated with income and the value of debt. Similarly, we would normally write the surplus process [ s_t = alpha b_t + gamma y_t. ] responding to both debt and GDP. If surplus is only cointegrated with GDP, one imposes ( alpha = 0), which amounts to assuming that governments do not repay debts. The surplus should be cointegrated with GDP and with the value of debt.  Governments with unit roots in GDP can indeed promise to repay their debts.



Source link

قالب وردپرس

Continue Reading

Economy

Campos: The Trump Delusion—Noted

Published

on


Paul Campos: The Trump Delusion https://www.lawyersgunsmoneyblog.com/2020/06/the-trump-delusion: ‘How is it that, despite everything, 40% of America continues to support Donald Trump? I’ve suggested that Trump’s supporters can be sorted into a few broad categories, with many of those supporters belonging to more than one of these groups: White nationalists…. Alienated burn it all down anti-establishment types…. Upper class Republicans who want big tax cut…. Religious conservatives, overwhelmingly white evangelicals…. Low information voters who always vote Republican out of tribal habit. These people have the most fantastical ideas about Trump, such as for example that he’s a “successful businessman,” rather than a “politician,” which is why he manages to “get things done.” This last group in particular includes a lot of overlap with the more cultish strain of religious conservatives…. Relatively few people are capable of maintaining a genuine lesser of two evils attitude toward the leader of an essentially charismatic—to use Weber’s typology—political movement. Almost everyone in the movement must eventually embrace the delusion that the leader is actually a good person, despite all evidence to the contrary. For example, the following message has gone viral on social media over the last few days. The text is headed by the photo at the top of this post:

Anonymous: 'Let’s look at this man for one damn second!!!! A 74-year-old man is coming back home from work at 2 AM while most men his age are retired in their vacation homes. He comes back after a long day that probably started before the sun rose and gets back home exhausted with his tie open and hat in his hand, feeling that an accomplished day is finally over…

…This amazing man is in the age range of many people’s grandfathers, great grandfathers, or my grandfather when he passed away, but this man just came back home from work, for me, for you. This man left his massive gold-covered mansion where he could retire happily and play golf all day long. But this man put his wealth aside and went to work for free, for $1 a year, for me, for you, for us, for AMERICA.

While other presidents became rich from the presidency, this man LOST over 2 billion dollars of his wealth during this short 4 years of his life. He put aside his amazing retirement lifestyle for getting ambushed every single day by the media and the Radical Left Democrats that trash this man who works for them until 1 AM for free!

No, he doesn’t do it for money or power, he already had it. He is doing it so their houses will be safe, so their schools will get better, so they will be able to find jobs or start a new business easier, so they will be able to keep few dollars in their pockets at the end of the month.

Look at this picture again, that man is at the age of your fathers, grandfathers or maybe YOU! Where is your respect? Honor? Appreciation? Are you THAT BLIND? THAT BLIND to not see a thing this man is doing for you and for your family? THAT BLIND that after all his work for minority groups in America you keep calling him a racist? I am the son of an Auschwitz Survivor and someone who lost 99% of my family to the camps and ovens of Nazi Germany. And I’m no fool! DONALD TRUMP IS NO RACIST OR ANTI-SEMITE!

Are you THAT BLIND to not see how much this country developed in last 4 years? President Donald J. Trump, I want to thank you with all my heart. I am so sorry for blind hatred you have been made to endure. You are a good and generous man. I KNOW THIS.

What I don’t know and think about often is what kind of people is it who can be so hateful in their hearts to spew such hate and evilness, not just at you but at your family too? Or people mocking and making jokes of you because you’re not a professional politician groomed in speech making and straight faced lying. Or how about them attacking your wife and young son? How awful that must make you feel.

People are sure they have not been manipulated. People believe their hatred is their own. But for why, they can’t articulate. What kind of people are these? WHAT KIND OF PEOPLE ARE THESE?? People not realizing they have been manipulated and brainwashed by such a deep-rooted EVILNESS MOTIVATED BY AN EVIL MEDIA AND DEMOCRAT PARTY. The American People are in a bad place right now….in their hearts and souls. God help us…Trump is not the problem.

This level of frankly delusional thinking is, I believe, far more common than either an enthusiastic embrace of anyone resembling the actual Donald Trump, or the sort of arms-length transactional support of people who recognize him for what he is, but have concluded that Paris is worth a mass.

Which is a fancy way of saying that a lot of his supporters are, at this point, basically insane.

…Meanwhile:

Aaron Rupar: 'This morning, Trump retweeted a QAnon account, thanked supporters of his who were filmed yelling “white power,” and issued a misleading non-denial of a story about him turning a blind eye while Russia offered bounties for US troops. All before 9 am…

.#noted #2020-07-10



Source link

قالب وردپرس

Continue Reading

Trending