Connect with us


Links (10/31/19)



  • Manufacturing Ain’t Great Again. Why? – Paul Krugman 
    When Donald Trump promised to Make America Great Again, his slogan meant different things to different people. For many supporters it meant restoring the political and social dominance of white people, white men in particular. For others, however, it meant restoring the kind of economy we had a generation or two ago, which offered lots of manly jobs for manly men: farmers, coal miners, manufacturing workers. So it may matter a lot, politically, that Trump has utterly failed to deliver on that front — and that workers are noticing. Now, many of Trump’s economic promises were obvious nonsense. The hollowing out of coal country reflected new technologies, like mountaintop removal, which require few workers, plus competition from other energy sources, especially natural gas but increasingly wind and solar power. Coal jobs aren’t coming back, no matter how dirty Trump lets the air get.
  • Stop Inflating the Inflation Threat – J. Bradford DeLong
    Given the scale and severity of inflation in America in the 1970s, it is understandable that US monetary policymakers developed a deep-seated fear of it. But, nearly a half-century later, the conditions that justified such worries no longer apply, and it is past time that we stopped denying what the data are telling us.
  • How to Tax Our Way Back to Justice – Saez and Zucman
    It is absurd that the working class is now paying higher tax rates than the richest people in America.
  • It's Time to Go – Dave Giles
    When I released my first post on the blog on 20th. Febuary 2011 I really wasn't sure what to expect! After all, I was aiming to reach a somewhat niche audience. Well, 949 posts and 7.4 million page-hits later, this blog has greatly exceeded my wildest expectations. However, I'm now retired and I turned 70 three months ago. I've decided to call it quits, and this is my final post. I'd rather make a definite decision about this than have the blog just fizzle into nothingness. For now, the Econometrics Beat blog will remain visible, but it will be closed for further comments and questions.
  • Prospects for Inflation in a High Pressure Economy: Is the Phillips Curve Dead or Is It Just Hibernating? – Brad DeLong 
    I have some disagreements with this by the smart Sufi, Mishkin, and Hooper: the evidence for "significant nonlinearity" in the Phillips Curve is that the curve flattens when inflation is low, not that it steepens when labor slack is low. There is simply no "strong evidence" of significant steepening with low labor slack. Yes, you can find specifications with a t-statistic of 2 in which this is the case, but you have to work hard to find such specifications, and your results are fragile. The fact is that in the United States between 1957 and 1988—the first half of the last 60 years—the slope of the simplest-possible adaptive-expectations Phillips Curve was -0.54: each one-percentage point fall in unemployment below the estimated natural rate boosted inflation in the subsequent year by 0.54%-points above its contemporary value. Since 1988—in the second half of the past 60 years—the slope of this simplest-possible Phillips curve has been effectively zero: the estimated regression coefficient has been not -0.54 but only -0.03. The most important observations driving the estimated negative slope of the Phillips Curve in the first half of the past sixty years were 1966, 1973, and 1974—inflation jumping up in times of relatively-low unemployment—and 1975, 1981, and 1982—inflation falling in times of relatively-high unemployment. The most important observations driving the estimated zero slope of the Phillips Curve in the second half of the past sixty years have been 2009-2014: the failure of inflation to fall as the economy took its Great-Recession excursion to a high-unemployment labor market with enormous slack. Yes, if we had analogues of (a) two presidents, Johnson and Nixon, desperate for a persistent high-pressure economy; (b) a Federal Reserve chair like Arthur Burns eager to accommodate presidential demands; (c) the rise of a global monopoly in the economy's key input able to deliver mammoth supply shocks; and (d) a decade of bad luck; then we might see a return to inflation as it was in the (pre-Iran crisis) early and mid-1970s. But is that really the tail risk we should be focused monomaniacally on? And how is it, exactly, that "the difference between national and city/state results in recent decades can be explained by the success that monetary policy has had in quelling inflation and anchoring inflation expectations since the 1980s"? Neither of those two should affect the estimated coefficient. Much more likely is simply that—at the national level and at the city/state level—the Phillips Curve becomes flat when inflation becomes low:
  • Debt, Doomsayers and Double Standards – Paul Krugman
    Selective deficit hysteria has done immense damage.
  • Fed Attempts To Conclude Their Mid-Cycle Adjustment – Tim Duy
    After spending much of the year battling the forces of uncertainty weighing on the economy, the Fed declared victory today. Absent a fresh deterioration in the economic outlook, Fed Chair Jerome Powell and his colleagues believe they are done cutting rates with this month’s policy move. Expect an extended policy pause; the Fed is neither interested in easing policy further given their outlook nor in soon raising rates back up given continued below-target inflation.
  • Fall 2019 Journal of Economic Perspectives Available Online – Tim Taylor
    I'll start with the Table of Contents for the just-released Fall 2019 issue, which in the Taylor household is known as issue #130. Below that are abstracts and direct links for all of the papers. I will probably blog more specifically about some of the papers in the next week or two, as well.
  • Does a wealth tax discourage risky investments? – Digitopoly
    The other day I wrote about the potential impact of a wealth tax. In so doing, I wrote: “we can all agree that the wealth tax likely deters risk-free saving.” This was a paraphrase of a claim made by Larry Summers who then went on to say that it was unknown whether a wealth tax would encourage or discourage risky investment. But I did wonder what the impact of a wealth tax would be on various types of investments and in examining this I realized that the claim was incorrect. In fact, a wealth tax is unlikely to have any change on the risk profile of investments in contrast to an income (or even consumption tax) that will. I discovered later that this was a known result being contained in a paper from Joe Stiglitz (QJE, 1969).
  • Will Libra Be Stillborn? – Barry Eichengreen
    Where the problem for economies and financial services is lack of competition, residents of developing countries need to look to their own regulators and politicians. The remedy for their woes is not going to come from Mark Zuckerberg.
  • Children of Poor Immigrants Rise, Regardless of Where They Come From – The New York Times 
    A pattern that has persisted for a century: They tend to outperform children of similarly poor native-born Americans.
  • The tempos of capitalism – Understanding Society
    I've been interested in the economic history of capitalism since the 1970s, and there are a few titles that stand out in my memory. There were the Marxist and neo-Marxist economic historians (Marx's Capital, E.P. Thompson, Eric Hobsbawm, Rodney Hilton, Robert Brenner, Charles Sabel); the debate over the nature of the industrial revolution (Deane and Cole, NFR Crafts, RM Hartwell, EL Jones); and volumes of the Cambridge Economic History of Europe. The history of British capitalism poses important questions for social theory: is there such a thing as "capitalism", or are there many capitalisms? What are the features of the capitalist social order that are most fundamental to its functioning and dynamics of development? Is Marx's intellectual construction of the "capitalist mode of production" a useful one? And does capitalism have a logic or tendency of development, as Marx believed, or is its history fundamentally contingent and path-dependent? Putting the point in concrete terms, was there a probable path of development from the "so-called primitive accumulation" to the establishment of factory production and urbanization to the extension of capitalist property relations throughout much of the world?
  • The Way We Measure the Economy Obscures What Is Really Going On – Heather Boushey
    By looking mainly at the big picture, we are missing the reality of inequality — and a chance to level the playing field.
  • Audits as Evidence: Experiments, Ensembles, and Enforcement – Brad DeLong
    This is absolutely brilliant, and quite surprising to me. I had imagined that most of discrimination in the aggregate was the result of a thumb placed lightly on the scale over and over and over again. Here Pat and Chris present evidence that, at least in employment, it is very different: that a relatively small proportion of employers really really discriminate massively, and that most follow race-neutral procedures and strategies:
  • Study analyzed tax treaties to assess effect of offshoring on domestic employment – EurekAlert
    The practice of offshoring–moving some of a company's manufacturing or services overseas to take advantage of lower costs–is on the rise and is a source of ongoing debate. A new study identified a way to determine how U.S. multinational firms' decisions about offshoring affect domestic employment. The study found that, on average, when U.S. multinationals increase employment in their foreign affiliates, they also modestly increase employment in the United States–albeit with substantial dislocation and reallocation of workers. The study was conducted by researchers at Carnegie Mellon University, Georgetown University, and the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. It is published in The Review of Economics and Statistics.

Source link

قالب وردپرس


Guest Contribution: “It’s (Long Past) Time for a Eurozone Brady Plan”



Today we are fortunate to be able to present a guest contribution written by Mark Copelovitch  (University of Wisconsin – Madison).

The COVID-19 crisis highlights the long-term consequences of past Eurozone policy mistakes. If the Euro is go­ing to survive another crisis, now is the time for a comprehensive debt solution.

 Eurozone countries are facing yet another crisis, as they struggle not only with the tragic public health consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, but also with the near-total sudden stop in the economy. The crisis, and the political debate over appropriate policy responses to it, have once again laid bare longstanding, fundamental problems in the Eurozone. The focus has rightly been on the immediate monetary and fiscal policy responses. But Eurozone countries’ ability to respond effectively to the crisis remain severely hampered by past policy errors that have left member-states – especially southern Eurozone countries – laden with debt and caught permanently in depression. Until and unless the Eurozone finally resolves these issues, the policy response to the Coronacrisis will almost certainly be insufficient, and the long-term prospects of the Eurozone will remain uncertain. It is long past time for the Eurozone to implement a comprehensive debt reduction plan that removes thirty years’ worth of debt overhang and creates the fiscal space for member-states to adequately respond to this and future crises.

A Europe-wide crisis in need of a Europe-wide response

COVID-19 has brought the Eurozone to a standstill. With economic activity crashing to a sudden stop, the need for rapid and massive monetary and fiscal policy intervention is clear. After an initial stumble, the ECB has stepped up. Last week, President Christine Lagarde embraced the “Draghi doctrine,” echoing former ECB President Mario Draghi and his famous 2012 line that “the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough.” In announcing the ECB’s plans to buy $750 billion of sovereign and corporate bonds to backstop Eurozone economies, Lagarde made clear that “There are no limits to our commitment to the euro. We are determined to use the full potential of our tools, within our mandate.”

This was welcome news. But the COVID-19 crisis also requires a joint response on fiscal policy. The problem, as Adam Tooze and Moritz Schularick noted last week, is that “no mechanism exists that allows the governments of the eurozone to respond jointly to such a shock. The result is that the policy reactions to the pandemic are so far overwhelmingly national.” The problem with primarily national responses, however, is that some Eurozone countries’ high debt levels and higher borrowing costs limit their capacity to respond aggressively with fiscal backstops. These differences are already starkly apparent, as comparisons between Germany and Italy’s fiscal rescue packages make clear. This is a recipe for both public health and economic disaster.

So what are the available options?  The best and most effective would be Eurobonds. This is why more than 300 scholars of the European Union (including me) signed an open letter, published last week in the Financial Times, urging European leaders to “mutualize the fiscal costs of fighting this crisis” by issuing a common European debt instrument. Unfortunately, we have already seen sharp political opposition to this from the so-called “frugal four” countries (Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Finland) on the predictable grounds that this would create moral hazard and punish those countries that had responsibly saved for a rainy day.

A second, though far inferior option would be to use the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to provide loans to individual countries in need. But the problem with this is obvious: it makes little sense for dealing with a common European shock for which no individual country is responsible. Moreover, ESM loans would only be used by countries with less fiscal room to maneuver, thereby carrying a similar stigma as previous IMF/Troika loans in the last Euro crisis. ESM chief Klaus Regling has downplayed these concerns, claiming that any such loans would have “very limited conditions.” But even limited conditionality would inevitably be politicized and end up diverting resources toward structural reforms and austerity in the midst of the mother of all liquidity crises. Consequently, it remains highly uncertain that Eurozone member-states would take advantage of any such ESM facilities in sufficient quantity to address the current problem.

Beyond these two options, smart scholars have now tabled a number of thoughtful proposals for further EU-wide fiscal initiatives. But all of these ideas are temporary and COVID-specific. They do little to address the deeper, underlying fiscal problem in the Eurozone: persistent, unsustainable debt overhang that has led to permanent austerity and stagnation in the southern Eurozone and transforms each new economic crisis into an existential challenge for the monetary union.  These problems existed before the COVID-19 crisis, and they will persist long afterward without reform. Indeed, the fiscal problems of Eurozone countries today are the cumulative result of policy errors made both at the Euro’s founding and in the Euro crisis from 2010 onward. These errors have left Greece, Italy, and others laden with unsustainable debt. Failure to address this debt overhang problem, once and for all, threatens not only the ability to deal effectively with the immediate COVID-19 crisis, but also the longer-term future of the Eurozone.

The pre-Eurozone era debt problems never ended

The Eurozone’s first mistake – its “original sin” – is that several countries were allowed to join the monetary union in the 1990s despite obviously failing to meet the debt-to-GDP requirement the Maastricht convergence criteria, which stated that “public debt must not exceed 60% of GDP, unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace.”  In the run-up to 1999, it was clear to everyone that Italy, Greece, and Belgium simply did not meet this criterion; none of these countries were remotely close to having debt levels in line with the other Eurozone countries, nor were they on trajectories to do so anytime in the foreseeable future.  Thus, while relaxing the Maastricht criteria was surely good European politics – allowing all interested member-states to join the Euro at the outset, including all of the “Original Six” founders of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 – it also created massive legacy debt problems that have proven to be crippling for countries that permanently sacrificed monetary and exchange rate policy autonomy once they adopted the single currency.

SOURCE: De Grauwe 2009

SOURCE: Larchinese 2020

This legacy debt problem is most clearly visible in Italy.  Indeed, Italy’s current debt problems are due almost entirely to its pre-Euro debt overhang, which has hung like the Sword of Damocles over Italian policymakers for decades. At about 130%, Italy’s debt-to-GDP ratio today is only slightly higher than it was in the mid-1990s. Measured by its primary budget surplus, Italy has been more fiscally prudent than even Germany since the establishment of the Euro two decades ago. Yet two decades of austerity never brought Italy’s debt-to-GDP ratio below 100%, leaving it now still facing the problem of lacking fiscal space to address a major economic crisis. The problems of ignoring the Maastricht criteria are still coming home to roost in 2020.

The last Eurozone crisis never ended

This legacy debt overhang has combined with the Eurozone’s second mistake: the failure to bring the last crisis to an end. Despite claims from European leaders that the Eurozone crisis has ended, the economic realities on the ground in the Southern EMU countries make it clear this is simply not the case. The level of economic devastation in Greece remains truly staggering. The country is now mired in a depression longer and deeper than the Great Depression itself, with GDP still more than 20% below 2007 levels, and a return to pre-crisis levels not in sight for years, if not decades. Beyond Greece, overall unemployment remains high throughout the southern Eurozone, with youth unemployment nearly 30% in Italy and higher in Spain and Greece.

Likewise, ECB monetary policy has never “normalized,” in the sense that the ECB has undershot its inflation target for nearly a decade. These two issues are, of course, related. It has been all but impossible for Spain, Greece, and Italy to adjust through internal devaluation and austerity while Eurozone monetary policy has remained targeted to the economic situation in Germany and the Netherlands rather than the Eurozone as a whole. In any case, the cumulative failure of the ECB to meet its inflation target means that price levels in the Eurozone are now about 10% below what they would be based on target projections. This has prolonged Eurozone stagnation and severely hampered the southern states’ ability to fully recover from the last crisis.


Beyond this, of course, the policy response to the Eurozone crisis failed to address the underlying institutional gaps and macroeconomic imbalances in the monetary union. In particular, banking union has not broken the sovereign-bank “doom loop.” Instead, the web of interlocking bank exposure to Eurozone sovereign debt remains thickly intertwined: French banks remain highly exposed to Italian and Spanish debt. Spanish and Italian banks remain highly exposed to each other’s sovereign debt, while Spanish banks remain highly exposed to Portuguese sovereign debt.

Furthermore, as we are now seeing with the rancorous debate over Eurobonds, neither the establishment of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) nor the ECB’s massive asset purchasing programs have addressed the fundamental macroeconomic and debt imbalances in the Eurozone. Instead, as last week’s row between the Dutch and Portuguese governments over “solidarity” and Eurobonds illustrated, too many Eurozone leaders remain beholden to the unhelpful narrative of “Northern Saints” and “Southern Sinners,” in which debt is always equated completely with bad policies and never ascribed to structural problems of monetary union.

If not Eurobonds, then comprehensive debt relief

In short, the Eurozone entered this latest crisis without having resolved either the debt and macroeconomic imbalance problems that existed in 1999, or the ones that have festered since 2010. It has chosen not to pursue the deeper political and fiscal integration that would solidify the monetary union, and the emerging disagreements over Eurobonds strongly suggest that the political support for any such deeper integration and reform still does not exist.

A more feasible solution is for the Eurozone to finally adopt a comprehensive debt reduction plan, along the lines of the Brady Plan adopted in 1989 to end the Latin American debt crisis.  A Eurozone Brady Plan would be far easier to implement than the original, since the ECB and Eurogroup now hold half of all Eurozone sovereign debt themselves. The mechanics of this also would not be particularly complicated. Indeed, viable proposals have circulated for quite a while now. Countries could offer new bonds, involving both very long-term maturity extension and substantial principal reduction. The ECB and Eurogroup could take larger haircuts than private creditors. The debt relief provided by such a plan could provide all Eurozone countries – but most especially Italy and Greece – with substantial fiscal policy breathing space to address the COVID-19 crisis, as well as future crises. In addition, it would help end the debt-deflation spiral in the Eurozone and unwind the sovereign-bank doom loop that persists a decade after the Eurozone crisis began. In this environment, the need for Eurobonds or country-specific conditional ESM loans would be substantially diminished, if not eliminated.

Undoubtedly, critics of comprehensive Eurozone debt relief will reply that debt reduction will fuel moral hazard and that Italy and Greece’s problems require deeper structural reforms that debt relief will not address. To the first concern, the best reply still remains the one Ricardo Hausmann offered in the wake of the Asian financial crisis two decades ago: moral hazard simply is not the fundamental problem in financial crises and “other distortions are more binding.” One can respond similarly to the second concern. Yes, of course, structural reform is needed. But two decades of austerity and pretending that debt overhangs are sustainable has also not led to meaningful structural reform. Postponing long overdue debt reduction because of the specter of moral hazard or because there is more work to do on structural reforms is simply not a compelling argument. If anything, leaving southern European countries mired in depression with massive debt overhangs is likely to postpone serious structural reform of their economies for far longer.

Critics will also claim that Europe cannot afford debt relief, arguing that Italy, in particular, is “too big to fail, but too big to save.” It is key to recognize that the former is an economic assessment but the latter entirely political. The ECB and the Eurogroup collectively face essentially no resource constraint: the ECB issues the world’s #2 reserve currency and inflation is negligible. Many of the Euro-19 can borrow, both in the short- and long-term, at negative real interest rates, in essentially unlimited quantities. Perhaps comprehensive debt reduction would generate modest inflation in the Eurozone for the next decade. But this would actually be a welcome outcome that would finally enable the ECB to hit its inflation target consistently. As with Eurobonds, the only opposition to real solutions, then, is political.

If not now, when?

In sum, if the Eurozone is to be sustainable in the long run – and members are to have the fiscal space to respond to periodic crises such as the current one – then debt relief to create the necessary fiscal space may be the only politically viable solution. Again, deeper fiscal integration in the medium term, and a Coronabond issue in the short term, are the first-best policy options. But if this is not to be, given political realities, then a Eurozone Brady Plan is the next best option. And even if COVID-specific Eurobonds or other initiatives do become a reality, debt relief is still necessary to address the legacy debt overhangs in Greece, Italy, and elsewhere, and to facilitate long-term growth and on-target inflation in the Eurozone in the years ahead.

Now is the time for bold and creative initiatives to finally address the Eurozone’s persistent gaps and policy mistakes. Simply maintaining the current status quo – with its half-hearted fiscal solidarity and permanent fiscal austerity for southern European countries – will eventually lead to the Eurozone’s demise. The Euro has survived for two decades, in spite of its original sin and the policy errors of the last crisis. Some have taken this as evidence that those worrying about the Euro’s collapse over the last decade have been overly pessimistic. Yet as Herb Stein famously noted in regard to the US balance of payments deficit in the 1980s, “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.”  European leaders should seize the momentum for action provided by the pandemic crisis to finally, at long last, address the debt problems that threaten the single currency’s long-term survival.

This post written by Mark Copelovitch.

Source link

قالب وردپرس

Continue Reading


Brazil and COVID-19: Favela Residents and Indigenous Communities Among Those Most at Risk



As of noon on April 8th the total number of Covid-19 positive cases reported by Brazil’s health ministry exceeded 14,000 and the number of deaths exceeded 700. This is, by far, the highest number of reported cases in Latin America (though Ecuador has a greater number of reported cases and deaths on a per capita basis).  The actual number of cases is likely many times greater, given that the current rate of testing for Covid-19 in Brazil is still very low – 258 per million, compared to 3,159 per million in Chile, 6,423 per million in the U.S. and 10,962 per million in Germany. In São Paulo, Brazil’s biggest city, and the hardest hit urban area in the country, the local health secretariat is reportedly only providing tallies for severe cases of the virus.

Far right Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro, an admirer and close ally of President Trump, has been seriously downplaying the gravity of the pandemic. He has referred to the virus as a “little flu” and has openly flouted social distancing measures, promoting political rallies in mid March and wading into crowds of supporters.  Ironically, prior to the recent rallies, senior members of Bolsonaro’s cabinet tested positive for the virus following an international trip that included a meeting with Trump at Mar-a-Lago.  These and other members of the delegation were among the first imported cases of Covid-19 to Brazil (and it is rumored that Bolsonaro himself was infected).

As seems to be the case with his U.S. counterpart and mentor, Bolsonaro’s rejection of experts’ recommendations has a clear motivation: keeping the economy running at all costs.  Even before the virus arrived, Brazil’s economy was in sad shape, with no signs of real recovery following a deep recession in 2015-16. Unemployment remained stubbornly high (more than 11.6 percent in February) and economic growth stood at less than one percent during the first year of Bolsonaro’s presidency (as might be expected given the government’s constitutionally-mandated austerity policies).  As is the case in most of Latin America (see ECLAC’s grim predictions for the region), business state and local shut-downs and stay-at-home measures designed to save hundreds of thousands of lives are expected to have devastating economic consequences.  Brazil’s biggest bank, Itaú, forecasts as much as 6.4% negative economic growth for 2020 alone if virus containment measures are maintained for an extended period of time.

In response to these and other dire predictions, Brazil’s lower house has passed a “war budget” amendment to the constitution, which – if approved by 3/5 of the Senate – will ease current draconian budget constraints and allow the state to engage in significant deficit spending to try to address the country’s looming health and economic emergencies.  Meanwhile, many of Brazil’s state governors have ordered non-essential businesses to close and have supported social distancing measures. In response, Bolsonaro has engaged in heated clashes with governors and threatened to issue a decree forcing businesses to re-open throughout the country. He has also butted heads with his own health minister, Luis Henrique Mandetta, who has supported strong social distancing protocols, threatening at one point to fire him.  Currently Mandetta has the highest ratings of any politician in the country while Bolsonaro’s favorability ratings have been sinking. Millions of people in cities across Brazil have protested Bolsonaro’s dismissive approach with regular panelaços – loud, pot-banging protests staged from residents’ windows and balconies. Brazil’s major leftwing leaders have called for the president’s resignation. 

It’s possible that Bolsonaro is making a long-term political calculation,  attempting to position himself to better weather the coming economic tsunami by blaming others for taking lifesaving measures that shut down much of the economy.  Here again, his behavior bears similarities with that of the occupant of the White House.

Regardless of what social distancing steps are taken throughout Brazil, many observers believe that the pandemic will exact a particularly terrible human and economic toll in the country’s poor favelas, where around 11 million people live.  Historically neglected by public authorities (apart from police agents engaged in increasingly widespread extrajudicial killings targeting Black youth), favela communities have extremely limited access to healthcare resources and water and sanitation infrastructures.  As Brazilian-Colombian researcher Nicole Froio explains in NACLA, many favela residents are simply unable to wash their hands regularly or practice social distancing measures in houses where large families share tiny living spaces.  Given the lack of effective support from the state, favela communities in Río de Janeiro and São Paulo are pooling scant resources to hire round-the-clock medical support. 

Brazil’s rural indigenous communities are also particularly vulnerable, given the fact that they are often located far away from hospitals able to treat infected patients with acute symptoms.  Ironically, the first indigenous Brazilian to test positive for Covid-19 is a healthcare worker who was in contact with an infected medical doctor who was visiting a remote Kokoma community.  Researchers fear that the virus could wreak enormous destruction and havoc in communities, especially as those at highest risk – the elderly – are typically the pillars of social order and transmitters of traditional knowledge.  In response to the pandemic, many indigenous peoples are likely to disperse into small groups, according to Dr. Sofia Mendonça, a researcher at the Federal University of São Paulo. Amnesty International reports that some communities are blocking roads and going into voluntary isolation to keep the pandemic at bay.    

Amnesty notes that Brazil’s indigenous communities are facing two sorts of attacks now.  Alongside the threat of Covid-19 infections, grileiros – those that illegally appropriate land – are taking advantage of the pandemic, and the fact that indigenous communities are prevented from effectively patrolling their territories, to step up the use of indigenous lands for illegal logging, agriculture and mining enterprises.  Government protection of indigenous lands has already been severely weakened under Bolsonaro – who has sought to open up indigenous lands for outside exploitation – and indigenous leaders who resist land invaders are being threatened and killed at an increasing rate.  On March 31st, Zezico Rodrigues Guajajara, a well-known Guajajara leader and opponent of illegal logging in Araribóia indigenous lands, was assassinated.  It was the fifth murder of a Guajajara land rights advocate so far this year, according to Amazon Watch.  

The post Brazil and COVID-19: Favela Residents and Indigenous Communities Among Those Most at Risk appeared first on Center for Economic and Policy Research.

Source link

قالب وردپرس

Continue Reading


How CEOs Are Ruining AmericaToday, America’s wealthiest business…



How CEOs Are Ruining America

Today, America’s wealthiest business moguls – like Jamie Dimon, head of JPMorgan Chase – claim that they are “patriots before CEOs” because they employ large numbers of workers or engage in corporate philanthropy.


CEOs are in business to make a profit and maximize their share prices, not to serve America. And yet these CEOs dominate American politics and essentially run the system. 

Therein lies the problem: They cannot be advocates for their corporations and simultaneously national leaders responsible for the wellbeing of the country. This is the biggest contradiction at the core of our broken system.

A frequent argument made by CEOs is that so-called “American competitiveness” should not be hobbled by regulations and taxes. Jamie Dimon often warns that tight banking regulations will cause Wall Street to lose financial business to banks in nations with weaker regulations. Under Dimon’s convenient logic, JPMorgan is America. 

Dimon used the same faulty logic about American competitiveness to support the Trump tax cut. “We don’t have a competitive tax system here,” he warned.

But when Dimon talks about “competitiveness” he’s really talking about the competitiveness of JPMorgan, its shareholders, and billionaire executives like himself.

The concept of “American competitiveness” is meaningless when it comes to a giant financial enterprise like JPMorgan that moves money all over the world. JPMorgan doesn’t care where it makes money. Its profits don’t directly depend on the wellbeing of Americans.

“American competitiveness” is just as meaningless when it comes to big American-based corporations that make and buy things all over the world. 

Consider a mainstay of corporate America, General Electric. Two decades ago, most GE workers were American. Today the majority are non-American. In 2017, GE announced it was increasing its investments in advanced manufacturing and robotics in China, which it termed “an important and critical market for GE.” In 2018, over half of GE’s revenue came from abroad. Its once core allegiance to American workers and consumers is gone.

Google has opened an Artificial Intelligence lab in Beijing. Until its employees forced the company to stop, Google was even building China a prototype search engine designed to be compatible with China’s censors.

Apple employs 90,000 people in the United States but contracts with roughly a million workers abroad. An Apple executive told The New York Times, “We don’t have an obligation to solve America’s problems. Our only obligation is making the best product possible” – and showing profits big enough to continually increase Apple’s share price.

American corporations will do and make things wherever around the world they can boost their profits the most, and invest in research and development wherever it will deliver the largest returns. 

The truth is that America’s real competitiveness doesn’t depend on profit-seeking shareholders or increasingly global corporations. The real competitiveness of the United States depends on only one thing: the productivity of Americans. 

That in turn depends on our education, our health, and the infrastructure that connects us. Yet today, American workers are hobbled by deteriorating schools, unaffordable college tuition, decaying infrastructure, and soaring health-care costs. 

And truth be told, big American corporations and the CEOs that head them – wielding outsized political influence – couldn’t care less. They want tax cuts and rollbacks of regulations so they can make even fatter profits. All of which is putting Americans on a glide path toward lousier jobs and lower wages. How’s that for patriotism?

The first step toward fixing this broken system is to stop buying CEOs’ lies. How can we believe that Jamie Dimon’s initiatives on corporate philanthropy are anything other than public relations? Why should we think that he or his fellow CEOs seek any goal other than making more money for themselves and their firms? We can’t and we shouldn’t. They don’t have America’s best interests at heart — they’re making millions to be CEOs, not patriots.

Big American corporations aren’t organized to promote the wellbeing of Americans, and Americans cannot thrive within a system run largely by corporations. Fundamental reform will be led only by concerned and active citizens.

Source link

قالب وردپرس

Continue Reading